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POSITIVE MODEL THEORY AND INFINITARY LOGIC
JEAN BERTHET
Abstract. We study the basic properties of a dual "spectral" topology on positive
type spaces of h-inductive theories and its essential connection to infinitary logic. The
topology is Hausdorff, has the Baire property, and its compactness characterises pos-
itive model completeness; it also has a basis of clopen sets and is described by the
formulas of geometric logic. The "geometric types" are closed in the type spaces under
all the operations of infinitary logic, and we introduce a positive analogue of exis-
tentially universal structures, through which we interpret the full first order logic in
positive type spaces. This shows how "positive ω-saturation" is a fundamental con-
nection between positive and infinitary logic, and we suggest a geometric analogue of
positive Morleyisation.
Introduction and background
Positive model theory was introduced in [2] and revisited in [3] in terms of the study
of positively existentially closed models of an h-inductive theory. In this context, which
may be construed as a generalisation of classical first order model theory by positive
Morleyisation, the spaces of types still play an essential role. Contrary to the classical
case, the definable topology on these spaces, though compact, is not Hausdorff, and the
fact that basic definably closed sets are not open in general implies that some properties
which are topologically linked to the definable topology in the classical setting, like
the existence of coheirs, fail to be reproducible in the positive context. In this note we
introduce and study, as a tool for positive model theory, a topology which is in some sense
"dual" to the definable topology, and intrinsically linked to the positively existentially
closed models of an h-inductive theory; we call it the "spectral" topology.
In section 1, we define the spectral topology and study its basic properties : it is Hausdorff
and finer than the definable topology, though not compact in general. Its compactness
characterises the positive model completeness of the Kaiser hull of the underlying theory
and in general, we may only count on an "infinitary compactness". We also show that the
spectral topology has the Baire property, and exhibit a particular basis of clopen sets, the
constructible subsets, which are analogous to the basic clopen sets of the classical type
spaces, and to which the notion of resultant may be extended. In section 2, we introduce
a description of spectrally open subsets by geometric formulas, using bounds from the
size of the language, and introduce the geometric types, generalising the partial positive
types. It turns out that the maximal ones are essential the positive types, whereas in
general their power of expression is much greater, as every subset of a positive type space
is decribed by such a type. In section 3, we connect these infinitary properties to full
first order logic, using a positive generalisation of existentially universal structures. The
existential models we obtain for h-inductive theories generalise the ω-saturated positively
existentially closed ones of [3], and using Karp’s theorem on infinitary equivalence we
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show that every formula of L∞ω has an interpretation as a subset of a positive type
space. This may be rephrased via positive Morleyisation as a bound on the complexity
of formulas necessary to describe the infinitary behavior of finite tuples in ω-saturated
structures in the classical setting. In the same spirit, we finish in section 4 by a reduction
of infinitary logic to geometric logic by an infinitary analogue of positive Morleyisation.
Conventions and notations. Our general reference for model theory is [5]. We work in a
many-sorted first order language L (as for instance in [7], 2.1), the subset of sort symbols
of which we note S. Relation symbols have a sorting and function symbols have an arity,
which are both a finite string (or "tuples") of sort symbols; in addition function (and
constant) symbols have a sort, which is a sort symbol; languages are interpreted in the
classical way. We fix the presence of two ∅-ary relation symbols ⊤ (true) and ⊥ (false),
interpreted in the obvious way in each L-structure. We work with a set V of variables,
each coming with a sort, and each sort having a countable supply of variables; we may
take V = S × ω, with a variable (s, i) ∈ V having sort s.
Formulas are considered only in L∞ω and are noted ϕ(x); striclty speaking this denotes
a couple (ϕ, x), where ϕ is a formula which free variables are among the finite tuple
x of variables. We use the same convention for terms t(x). We note V ∗ the set of all
finite tuples of variables. Such tuples are noted by single letters x, y, z, . . .; the expression
x∩y = ∅ is intended to mean that x and y have no common variables, while the notation
|x| = |y| means that x and y have the same sorting, i.e. the sorts of the variables appear-
ing in order in x and y are the same. A formula is positive (existential) if is is finitary
and mentions only finite conjunctions, disjunctions and existential quantifications; we
note L+ the set of positive formulas.
A sorted map of L-structures f : A → B is a family (fs)s∈S of maps fs : As → Bs for
each sort symbol s ∈ S; it is a (L-)homomorphism if for every atomic sentence ϕ(a) with
parameters in A such that A |= ϕ(a), we have B |= ϕ(fa). A homomorphism f : A→ B
is an immersion if for every positive sentence ϕ(a) with parameters in A, if B |= ϕ(fa)
then A |= ϕ(a).
If κ is a cardinal, by Lκω we mean the smallest subclass of formulas of L∞ω, which
contains atomic formulas and is closed under negation, conjuncts or disjuncts of sets of
formulas of size < κ, and finite quantifications. The language L∞ω is the union of the
classes Lκω. We distinguish as in [7] the geometric formulas of L∞ω, which class L
g
∞ω is
the smallest subclass of L∞ω containing the atomic formulas and closed under finite con-
jonctions, existential quantifications over single variables and arbitrary disjunctions, and
we note Lgκω = L
g
∞ω ∩ Lκω. Our references for positive model theory are [2] and [3], but
our exposition follows more closely [3]. We review the basic elements in a many-sorted
context and provide some special notation and terminology.
h-Inductive theories and positive models. We say with [3] that a finitary first order L-
sentence is h-inductive, if it is a finite conjunct of basic h-inductive sentences, which have
the form ∀x (ϕ(x) ⇒ ψ(x)), where ϕ(x) and ψ(x) are positive formulas. A first order
L-theory T is h-inductive, if it consists of h-inductive sentences. The models of such a
theory T form an inductive class, i.e. closed under directed colimits of L-homomorphisms.
If C is a class of L-structures and A ∈ C, A is positively existentially closed in C if every
L-homomorphism f : A→ B, with B ∈ C, is an immersion.
POSITIVE MODEL THEORY AND INFINITARY LOGIC 3
Fact 0.1 ([3], Theorem 1). In an inductive class, every structure continues into a posi-
tively existentially closed one.
If T is h-inductive, we note M(T ) the full subcategory of its models and M+(T ) the
full subcategory of positively existentially closed models of T . In order to lighten the
terminology and avoid confusion with classical existential completness, we suggest to call
the objects of M+(T ) the positive models of T . If every model of T is positive (i.e. if
M(T ) =M+(T )) we say that T is positively model complete.
Fact 0.2 ([3], Lemma 15). T is positively model complete if and only if for every positive
formula ϕ(x), there exists a positive formula ψ(x) such that T |= ∀x(ϕ(x) ∧ ψ(x) ⇒ ⊥)
and T |= ∀x(⊤ ⇒ ϕ(x) ∨ ψ(x)).
We define as in ([1], Definition 9), the resultant of a positive formula ϕ(x), which is the
set ResT (ϕ(x)) of all positive formulas ψ(x) such that T |= ∀x(ϕ(x)∧ψ(x)⇒ ⊥). Using
Lemma 14 of [3], it is possible to characterise the positive models of T as follows.
Fact 0.3. A model M of T is positive if and only if for every positive formula ϕ(x), we
have Mx − ϕ(x)
M =
⋃
{ψ(x)M : ψ ∈ ResT (ϕ)}.
h-Universal sentences and companions. A (basic) h-inductive sentence is h-universal if
it has the form ∀x (ϕ(x) ⇒ ⊥), with ϕ(x) positive. We note Tu the set of h-universal
consequences of T .
Fact 0.4 ([3], Lemma 5). An L-structure A is a model of Tu if and only if there exists
an L-homomorphism f : A→M into a model M of T .
If A is an L-structure, we note L(A) the expansion of L by the elements of A naming
themselves, and D+A the atomic diagram of A, i.e. the set of atomic sentences with
parameters in A which are true in A. A model B of D+A is essentially the same thing as
an L-homomorphism f : A → B, preserving the canonical interpretation of A in itself.
By the fact, L-homomorphisms from A into a model of T are essentially the models of
Tu ∪D
+A in the language L(A).
If T ′ is another h-inductive theory in the same language, we say that T and T ′ are positive
companions if they have the same positive models, i.e. M+(T ) =M+(T ′). The Kaiser
hull of T , noted Tk, is the class of all h-inductives sentences which are satisfied in every
positive model of T .
Fact 0.5 ([3], Lemma 7). Tu is the smallest positive companion of T and Tk is the largest
positive companion of T .
Spaces of positive types. If x is a (possibly infinite) tuple of variables (or of new type
constants), a positive type in T in variables x is a set p of positive formulas ϕ(x), such
that T ∪ p(x) is consistent, and p(x) is maximal with this property. We write Sx(T )
the set of all such positive types. The sets of the form [ϕ(x)] = {p ∈ Sx(T ) : ϕ ∈ ϕ},
for positive formulas ϕ(x), are closed under finite unions and intersections, and are the
basic closed sets of the definable topology on Sx(T ), which we will note D . If A is an
L-structure, x is a finite tuple of variables and a ∈Mx, the positive type of a inM , noted
tp+A(a), is the set of all positive formulas ϕ(x) such that A |= ϕ(a).
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Fact 0.6 ([3], Lemma 13). For every finite tuple of variables x, the positive types of
Sx(T ) are the positive types of corresponding tuples in positive models of T , and we
have Sx(Tu) = Sx(T ) = Sx(Tk).
Fact 0.7 ([3], Lemma 16). The definable topology is compact, though not Hausdorff in
general.
1. The spectral topology
From now on, T is an h-inductive theory in a first order language L, x a finite tuple of
variables, Sx(T ) is the set of positive types in the tuple x. If ϕ(x) ∈ L
+, we recall that
[ϕ(x)] = {p ∈ Sx(T ) : ϕ ∈ p}.
Definition 1.1. The spectral topology on Sx(T ) is the topology S which basis of open
sets are the sets [ϕ], for ϕ(x) ∈ L+.
Proposition 1.2. The spectral topology is Hausdorff and finer than the definable topol-
ogy.
Proof. Suppose that p ∈ Sx(T ) and ϕ(x) ∈ L
+. If p /∈ [ϕ], let M |=+ T and a ∈ Mx a
realisation of p in M : as M is positive, there exists ψ ∈ ResT (ϕ) such that M |= ψ(a),
and as p is maximal, we have ψ ∈ p, i.e. p ∈ [ψ]. Reciprocally, if ψ ∈ ResT (ϕ)
and p ∈ [ψ], by consistency of p we have ϕ /∈ p, i.e. p /∈ [ϕ]. This means we have
Sx(T ) − [ϕ] =
⋃
{[ψ] : ψ ∈ ResT (ϕ)} and this last is open for the spectral topology, so
[ϕ] itself is spectrally closed. The basic definably closed sets [ϕ] are closed for S , hence
S is finer than D . As for Hausdorff separation, if q 6= p is another positive type, by
maximality of such there exists a formula ϕ such that ϕ ∈ p− q; this means that p ∈ [ϕ],
whereas q ∈ [ϕ]c and we have just seen that this last set is spectrally open, so the disjoint
opens [ϕ] and [ϕ]c separate p and q. 
Example 1.3. Let T be the h-inductive theory of (strict) linear orders in the language
{<} : its positive models are the dense linear orders, which is a consequence of quantifier
elimination for Tk, or may be checked directly. The rational order (Q, <) is a positive
model, and the assignation to every element of R = R ∪ {−∞,+∞} of its (positive)
type over Q is a bijection between R and S1(Q). The spectral topology on S1(Q) in-
duces a topology on R, which happens to be the classical definable one by the following
proposition..
Proposition 1.4. Tk is positively model complete if and only if for every finite tuple
x ∈ V ∗ the space Sx(T ) is compact for the spectral topology, and in this case the two
topologies coincide with the classical definable topology (and M+(T ) =M(Tk)).
Proof. If Tk is positively model complete, every L-formula is equivalent modulo Tk to
a positive formula, hence the positive types spaces Sx(T ) = Sx(Tk) are homeomorphic
to the classic type spaces (for the spectral topology), hence the positive type spaces are
compact Hausdorff.
Reciprocally, suppose that every space of (positive) types is spectrally compact and let
ϕ(x) ∈ L+. In Sx(T ) the complement Sx(T )− [ϕ] =
⋃
ψ∈ResT (ϕ)
[ψ] is spectrally closed,
hence compact, so we may find a finite subset of ResT (ϕ), in fact a single ψ ∈ ResT (ϕ),
such that Sx(T ) − [ϕ] = [ψ]. Now if M |=
+ T and a ∈ Mx is such that M 6|= ϕ(a),
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we have tp(a) = p /∈ [ϕ], hence p ∈ [ψ], which means that M |= ψ(a). In other words,
ψ(x) defines a complement of ϕ modulo Tk, which is then positively model complete (and
axiomatises the positive models of T ). 
Example 1.5. (i) There are many examples where Tk is not positively model complete;
for instance, if Tk is not Hausdorff (see [2] and [3]), then the definable topology cannot
coincide with the spectral topology, which is then not compact.
(ii) A great counterexample to the proposition is given by the h-inductive theory T of
division rings in the language (+,×,−, 0, 1) of rings, as mentionned in [4], Chapter 14.
Indeed, one checks that the division rings are axiomatisable by h-inductive sentences, and
that the positive division rings are exactly the existentially closed (in the classical sense)
division rings, because every existential formula is equivalent modulo T to a positive
formula, replacing inequations P (x) 6= 0 by (∃y) P (x).y = 1. It is well known that these
do not form an axiomatisable class, hence Tk is not positively model complete.
Definition 1.6. If κ is a cardinal, say that a topological space X is κ-compact if for
every open cover X =
⋃
i∈I Oi, there exists a subset J ⊂ I, such that |J | < κ and
X =
⋃
i∈J Oi.
Proposition 1.7. If κ = |L|, for every finite tuple x of variables, the spectral topology
on Sx(T ) is κ
+-compact.
Proof. Suppose that Sx(T ) =
⋃
i∈I Oi, with Oi a spectral open for each i. By definition
of the spectral topology, for every i ∈ I there exists a family (ϕij(x))j∈Ji of positive
formulas such that Oi =
⋃
j∈Ji
[ϕij(x)]. This means we have Sx(T ) =
⋃
{[ϕij(x)] : (i, j) ∈⋃
i∈I{i} × Ji}. Now the set of positive L-formulas with free variables among x has
cardinality κ<ω = κ, hence we may choose a subset K ⊂
⋃
i∈I({i} × Ji) such that
|K| ≤ κ and Sx(T ) =
⋃
(i,j)∈K [ϕ
i
j ]. Let I
′ be the set of all i ∈ I such that (i, j) ∈ K : we
have |I ′| ≤ |K|. For every (i, j) ∈ K, we have [ϕij ] ⊂ Oi, whence Sx(T ) =
⋃
(i,j)∈K [ϕ
i
j ] =⋃
i∈I′ Oi, and the proof is complete. 
Remember that a topological space E has the Baire property, if for every countable
family (Oi)i<ω of dense subsets of E, the intersection
⋂
i<ω Oi is still a dense subset of
E.
Proposition 1.8. The positive type spaces Sx(T ) have the Baire property for the spectral
topology.
Proof. Let (Ui : i < ω) be a countable family of dense spectrally open subsets of Sx(T )
and O a non empty spectrally open subset of Sx(T ). As O 6= ∅, by definition of the
spectral topology we may find a formula ϕ0(x) such that ∅ 6= [ϕ0] ⊂ O. Suppose
by induction hypothesis that n < ω and we have found (ϕi(x) : i ≤ n) such that
∅ 6= [ϕj ] ⊂ [ϕi] for j ≥ i and [ϕn] ⊂ O ∩ (
⋂
i<n Ui). As Un is dense and [ϕn] is open for
the spectral topology, there exists a formula ϕn+1(x) such that ∅ 6= [ϕn+1] ⊂ [ϕn]∩Un ⊂
O ∩ (
⋂
i<n+1 Ui). By induction, we find a decreasing family ([ϕi])i<ω of basic definably
closed sets : as the definable topology is compact, the intersection of the family is non
empty and included in O ∩ (
⋂
i<ω Ui), which is then non empty, and
⋂
i<ω Ui is dense :
the spectral topology has the Baire property. 
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Boolean combinations of positive formulas define subsets of positive type spaces, in
the following way. For ϕ(x), ψ(x) positive, we know that [ψ(x)]c is a spectral open of
Sx(T ), hence we may define [¬ψ] as [ψ]
c, and [ϕ∧¬ψ] = [ϕ]∩ [¬ψ], a spectrally open set.
As every Boolean combination χ of positive formulas is formally equivalent to a finite
disjunction of formulas of the form ϕ ∧ ¬ψ with ϕ and ψ positive, every such Boolean
combination defines a subset of Sx(T ), which is spectrally open (and one checks that this
does not depend on the representation of χ).
Definition 1.9. Say that a formula ϕ of L is constructible, if it is a Boolean combination
of positive formulas. Likewise, say that a subset S of Sx(T ) is constructible, if there exists
a constructible formula ϕ(x) of L such that S = [ϕ(x)].
Now by definition every spectrally open subset of Sx(T ) is a union of constructible sets,
and every constructible set is a spectral open, so the collection of constructible subsets
is a basis for the spectral topology on Sx(T ). The notion of resultant may be extended
to all constructible formulas in the context of positive logic, using the Kaiser hull of T .
Definition 1.10. If ϕ(x) is a constructible formula, define the constructible resultant
of ϕ modulo T as the set RescT (ϕ) of all constructible formulas ψ(x) such that Tk |=
∀x ϕ ∧ ψ ⇒ ⊥.
Remark 1.11. The constructible resultant is defined relatively to Tk, as compared to
the (positive) resultant, defined relatively to Tu, because the sentences expressing the
incompatibility of two constructible formulas are not h-universal in general, while they
may be encoded in Tk.
Proposition 1.12. For every constructible formula ϕ(x), we have [ϕ(x)]c =
⋃
{[ψ(x)] :
ψ ∈ RescT (ϕ)}.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the complexity of the formula ϕ.
- If ϕ is atomic, then we have [ϕ]c =
⋃
{[ψ] : ψ ∈ ResT (ϕ)} ⊂
⋃
{[ψ] : ψ ∈ RescT (ϕ)} ⊂
[ϕ]c, by definition of the resultant, whence the equality.
- If ϕ = ¬ψ, we have [ϕ]c = [ψ] ⊂
⋃
{[θ] : θ ∈ RescT (ϕ)} (because ψ ∈ Res
c
T (¬ψ) !)
⊂ [ϕ]c, whence the equality.
- If ϕ = ψ∨χ and (θ, λ) ∈ RescT (ψ)×Res
c
T (χ), it is easy to check that θ∧λ ∈ Res
c
T (ψ∨χ),
hence we get [ϕ]c = [ψ]c ∩ [χ]c =
⋃
{[θ] : θ ∈ RescT (ψ)} ∩
⋃
{[λ] : λ ∈ RescT (χ)} (by
induction hypothesis) ⊂
⋃
{[ζ] : ζ ∈ RescT (ψ ∨ χ)} ⊂ [ϕ]
c, whence the equality.
- If ϕ = ψ ∧ χ, we have [ψ ∧ χ]c = [
∨
RescT (ψ)] ∪ [
∨
RescT (χ)] (by induction hypothesis)
⊂ [
∨
RescT (ψ ∧ χ)] ⊂ [ψ ∧ χ]
c, whence the equality. 
The end of this section illustrates how the spectral topology embraces a mild treatment
of the negation in positive logic, in the form of constructible formulas and sets. Now
every spectral open is by definition a union of "positively definable" subsets, and the
constructible subsets form a finer basis of topology than the positively definable ones.
The question arises of comparising constructible subsets to spectral opens. In general,
there are more spectrally open than constructible subsets, otherwise every spectral open
would have a spectrally open complement, which fails for instance in every positively
model complete theory in which not every type definable set is definable. We discuss an
example where we invoke classical model theory.
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Example 1.13. Consider the theory T of real fields in the language L = (+,×,−, 0, 1)
of rings, the positive models of which are the real closed fields, which are axiomatisable
by a positive model complete theory T ∗; notice that here the spectral and the definable
topologies coincide by Proposition 1.4. It is easy to see that in R, Cantor’s triadic set
K is (positively) type definable without parameters, by a partial positive type pi(x) in
one variable. This type defines in S1(T ) a definably closed set [pi(x)], which is then
spectrally closed. Now suppose that [pi(x)] is spectrally open in S1(T ) : there exists
a family (ϕi(x))I of formulas in one variable such that [pi(x)] =
⋃
i∈I [ϕi], and as there
are only |L| = ω such formulas, we may suppose that I is at most countable. As R is
a real closed field, we have K =
⋃
i<ω ϕi(x)
R and as R is o-minimal as considered as a
classical L-structure, every ϕi(x)
R is a finite union of intervals, hence K is a countable
union of intervals K =
⋃
i<ω Ii. As |K| > ω, one of those contains at least two points,
contradicting the fact that K has empty interior. This means that S1(T )− [pi(x)] is open
but not constructible.
2. Geometric formulas and types
In this section we study the relationships between the spectral topology and geometric
logic, and show that in this context the analogues of partial positive types define all the
subsets of Sx(T ). From now on, we set κ = |Lωω| and refer to the introduction for the
definition of the class Lg∞ω of geometric formulas.
Lemma 2.1 (Disjunctive normal form). Every geometric formula is logically equivalent
to a disjunction of positive primitive formulas. In particular, every geometric formula is
equivalent to one in L2κω.
Proof. For atomic formulas, there is nothing to prove. Suppose that (ϕi : i < m) is
a finite set of geometric formulas, each equivalent to a disjunct
∨
Φi of a set of p.p.
formulas. The formula
∧
i<m ϕi is equivalent to
∨
{
∧
i<m ψi : ψi ∈ Φi, i < m}. Suppose
that ϕ is logically equivalent to a disjunct
∨
Φ of a set of p.p. formulas : if x is any
variable, the formula ∃xϕ is logically equivalent to the disjunct
∨
{∃xψ : ψ ∈ Φ} of p.p.
formulas. Finally, if Φ is a set of geometric formulas, each ϕ ∈ Φ being equivalent to a
disjunct
∨
Ψϕ of a set of p.p. formulas, the disjunct
∨
Φ is logically equivalent to the
disjunct
∨
(
⋃
{Ψϕ : ϕ ∈ Φ}). This proves the existence of a disjunctive form.
Now as the set of positive primitive formulas of L has cardinality at most κ = |L|, any
set Φ of p.p. formulas has cardinality at most κ, hence
∨
Φ ∈ L2κω, which establishes
the second part. 
Definition 2.2. (i) A disjunctive normal form of a geometric formula is an equivalent
disjunction of p.p. formulas, by the lemma.
(ii) We will say that a geometric formula is normal, if it is a disjunctive normal form.
By the lemma, the class of all geometric formulas ϕ(x) satisfied in an L-structure M
by a point a ∈Mx is determined by the set of normal geometric formulas ϕ(x) such that
M |= ϕ(a).
Definition 2.3. (i) If M is an L-structure, x is a finite tuple of variables and a ∈ Mx,
the geometric type of a in M , noted tpgM(a), will denote the set of normal geometric
formulas ϕ(x) such that M |= ϕ(a).
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(ii) More generally, by a geometric type in variables x, we will mean a set pi(x) of geometric
formulas; we will call it normal if it contains normal formulas only.
Now let p(x) be a positive type over T , and a, b two realisations of p in positive models
M,N of T . If ϕ(x) =
∨
Φ(x) is a normal geometric formula such that M |= ϕ(a), there
exists ψ ∈ Φ such that M |= ψ(a), and hence ψ ∈ p, which means that N |= ψ(b), and
N |= ϕ(b). In other words, every positive type p(x) determines a unique set p∗(x) of
normal geometric formulas. We complete this remark as the following
Proposition 2.4. The map p 7→ p∗, which maps a positive type p(x) to the geometric
type of any of its realisations, is a bijection from Sx(T ) to the set of normal geometric
types which are consistent with T and maximal with this property.
Proof. First, if p∗(x) ⊂ pi(x), a geometric type consistent with T , let a ∈ Mx be a
realisation of pi in a modelM of T . As the validity of geometric sentences with parameters
is preserved under homomorphisms, we may suppose that M is a positive model of T .
Let ϕ ∈ pi : there exists a set Φ of p.p. formulas such that ϕ =
∨
Φ, so there is ψ ∈ Φ
such thatM |= ψ(a), whence ψ ∈ p by maximality of p, so ϕ ∈ p∗, and p∗ = pi is maximal
as a geometric type consistent with T .
Secondly, if q is a maximal geometric type consistent with T , realise q by a point a ∈Mx
of a positive model M of T : the positive type p = tp+M (a) is an element of Sx(T ) such
that p∗ = q by definition of p∗, so the map is surjective. Now if p, q ∈ Sx(T ) and p
∗ = q∗,
any realisation of p∗ is a realisation of both p and q, hence p = q by their maximality,
and the map is injective. 
All this means that any geometric formula ϕ(x) defines a subset of Sx(T ), by [ϕ(x)] =
{p ∈ Sx(T ) : p
∗ |= ϕ}, in which by p∗ |= ϕ we mean that for some (any) normal form ψ
of ϕ, we have ψ ∈ p∗. Now the following (the second part of which could alternatively
be proved using Lemma 17 of [3]) should be obvious.
Corollary 2.5. The subsets of the form [ϕ(x)], for a geometric formula ϕ(x), are exactly
the spectrally open subsets of Sx(T ), and for every finite tuple y of variables, the canonical
projection map pi : Sxy(T )→ Sx(T ) is open for the spectral topology.
Proof. Using a disjunctive normal form
∨
Φ(x) for a geometric formula ϕ, we see that
[ϕ(x)] =
⋃
{[ψ] : ψ ∈ Φ}, hence is open for the spectral topology. Conversely, if O
is open for the spectral topology, find a family (ϕi(x))I of positive formulas such that
O =
⋃
I [ϕi(x)] : we have O = [
∨
{ϕi : i ∈ I}], and as
∨
{ϕi : i ∈ I} is geometric, this
is enough for the first part. As for the second, if [ϕ(x, y)] is spectrally open in Sxy(T )
with ϕ geometric, it is easy to check that pi([ϕ(x, y)]) is the open subset defined by the
geometric formula ∃yϕ(x, y). 
For every positive type p ∈ Sx(T ), the singleton {p} =
⋂
{[ϕ(x)] ∈ L+ : ϕ ∈ p} is
closed for the definable topology, hence for the spectral topology. Explicitly, we may
describe its spectrally open complement Sx(T )−{p(x)} =
⋃
ϕ∈p
⋃
ψ∈ResT (ϕ)
[ψ(x)]. Now
the spectral topology of Sx(T ) may itself be construed as a collection of basic closed sets
for a certain topology, which is analogous to the definable topology, in the sense that the
basic closed sets have the form [ϕ(x)] for any geometric formula ϕ(x). What precedes
shows that every singleton is open for this topology, which is then trivial. In other words,
we have the
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Proposition 2.6. For every subset X of Sx(T ), there exists a geometric type pi(x) such
that X = [pi(x)], where [pi(x)] = {p ∈ Sx(T ) : ∀ϕ ∈ pi, p
∗ |= ϕ}.
In particular, the geometric types have a uniform complement in positive models of
T . For a geometric type pi(x), there exists an alternative description of this complement,
which goes as follows. Let {pii(x) : i ∈ I} be a family of geometric types. We define the
disjunction
∨
I pii(x) as the geometric type {
∨
i∈I ϕi(x) : ∀i ∈ I, ϕi ∈ pii}.
Lemma 2.7. The type
∨
I pii is logically equivalent to the disjunction of the pii’s.
Proof. Write pi(x) =
∨
I pii(x). Let M be an L-structure and a ∈
⋃
I pii(x)
M : there is
i0 ∈ I such that a ∈ pii0(x)
M , so let ϕ(x) =
∨
I ϕi(x) ∈ pi(x) : we have M |= ϕi0(a), so
M |= ϕ(a), hence a ∈ pi(x)M . Reciprocally, suppose that a /∈
⋃
I pii(x)
M and let i ∈ I :
we have a /∈ pii(x)
M , so there is ϕi(x) ∈ pii(x) such that M 6|= ϕi(a). This means that
M 6|=
∨
I ϕi(a), hence a /∈ pi(x)
M , because this last formula
∨
I ϕi(x) is in pi(x). 
Proposition 2.8. Every geometric type pi(x) has a uniform geometric complement in
positive models of T (i.e., there exists a geometric type ¬Tpi(x) such that ¬Tpi(x)
M defines
the complement of pi(x)M in every positive model M of T ).
Proof. We start with a geometric formula ϕ(x). Up to logical equivalence, we may
suppose that ϕ(x) =
∨
I ϕi(x) is normal, i.e. with ϕi positive primitive for each i ∈ I. If
i ∈ I, let Φi(x) = ResT (ϕi(x)), a set of positive formulas : the formula
∨
Φi(x), which we
note ¬Tϕi(x), is geometric. Let ¬Tϕ(x) = {¬Tϕi(x) : i ∈ I} ; this is a geometric type,
and if M |=+ T , we have Mx − ϕ(x)
M = Mx −
⋃
i∈I ϕi(x)
M =
⋂
i∈I(Mx − ϕi(x)
M ) =
⋂
i∈I ¬Tϕi(x)
M (by the properties of the resultant) = (¬Tϕ(x))
M , so the geometric type
¬Tϕ(x) defines the complement of the geometric formula ϕ(x) in every positive model
of T .
If now pi(x) is a geometric type, we define ¬Tpi(x) as the geometric type
∨
{¬Tϕ(x) :
ϕ(x) ∈ pi(x)}, and we contend that ¬Tpi defines the complement of pi in every positive
model of T . Indeed, ifM |=+ T , we haveMx−pi(x)
M =Mx−
⋂
ϕ∈pi ϕ(x)
M =
⋃
ϕ∈pi(Mx−
ϕ(x)M ) =
⋃
ϕ∈pi ¬Tϕ(x)
M (by what precedes on the complements of geometric formulas)
= ¬Tpi(x)
M . 
In conclusion, the subsets of positive type spaces are essentially "abstract definitions"
for subsets of positive models of T defined by geometric types. In particular, geometric
types are closed under arbitrary disjunctions and conjunctions, as well as negations and
existential quantifications. With these properties they must interpret all the formulas in
L∞ω, which we make precise in the following section.
3. Existential models and infinitary logic
We adapt the notion of an existentially universal structure, defined originally in terms
of existential types in the context of inductive classes of extensions, to the present context
of inductive classes of homomorphisms and partial positive types (see [4], section 1.2).
Definition 3.1. Say that a structure M in a class C is (positively) existentially universal
(in C), if for every partial positive type pi(x, y) in finitely many variables and every point
b ∈ My such that pi(x, b) is realised in a continuation of M in C, there is a ∈ Mx such
that M |= pi(a, b).
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Remark 3.2. Any existentially universal structure in C is positively existentially closed;
this is a strengthening of the notion.
Proposition 3.3. If C is an inductive class, then every structure in C has a continuation
into an existentially universal structure of C.
Proof. It suffices to reproduce the construction of a positively existentially closed con-
tinuation, replacing positive formulas by partial positive types in the proof of Fact 0.1
found in [3]. 
Definition 3.4. (i) If T is an h-inductive theory, say that a model M of T is existential,
noted M |=e T , if it is a positively existentially universal structure of M(T ). Any
existential model is positive.
(ii) If M is an L-structure and f : M → N , we say that f is an existential extension of
M , if (N, f) is an existential model of T (M |M) (or equivalently of Tu(M |M)).
Remark 3.5. (i) An L-structure M is an existential model of T if and only if it is an
existential model of Tu, so T , Tu and Tk have the same existential models.
(ii) If T has the "joint continuation property" (i.e. any two models have a common
continuation into a third), the existential models of T are the positively ω-saturated
positive models of T introduced in [3].
(iii) For any L-structure M , an existential model N of T (M |M) is a positive extension
which realises all finitary positive types over Ma, for every point a from N .
(iv) By compactness, a universal domain U of cardinal at least |L|+ for a Π-theory T in
the positive fragment of positive formulas, as introduced in Definition 2.11 of [2], is an
existential model of T .
We recall that by Lemma 18 of [3], any two L-structures M,N with the same h-
universal theory U (without parameters), have the "joint continuation property", i.e.
there exist two homomorphisms f, g : M,N → P into a common codomain which is a
model of U . Frow this we get the following
Lemma 3.6. Let M,N |= T and a ∈ Mx, b ∈ Nx such that tp
+
M(a) = tp
+
N(b). There
exist P |= T and f :M → P , g : N → P , such that f(a) = g(b).
Proof. It is possible to restate the hypothesis as Tu(M |a) = Tu(M |b), because the h-
universal formulas satisfied by a in M and b in N are exactly the negations of the
formulas in their positive type. If c is an appropriate new tuple of constant symbols, the
theory Tu(M |a)(c/a) is complete in the language L(M∪c) so it has the joint continuation
property : there exists a model (P, d) |= Tu(M |a)(c/a) and two L(M∪c)-homomorphisms
f : (M,a) → (P, d) and g : (N, b) → (P, d). As Tu ⊂ Tu(M |a), we have P |= Tu and
f(a) = g(b) : continuing if necessary, we may suppose that P is a model of T . 
Theorem 3.7. If M and N are two existential models of an h-inductive theory T and
Tu(M) = Tu(N), then M and N are infinitely equivalent.
Proof. We build a back-and-forth system of partial isomorphisms between M and N and
use Karp’s theorem (Corollary 3.5.3 of [5]). Let S be the collection of all pairs (a, b)
of finite tuples with a from M and b from N , with the same sorting, and such that
tp+M (a) = tp
+
N(b). By hypothesis, we have (∅, ∅) ∈ S, because M and N satisfy the same
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h-universal, and hence the same positive sentences; thus, S is not empty. Let (a, b) ∈ S
and α ∈ My, for a variable y, and let p(x, y) = tp
+
M (a, α) : by definition of S we have
tp+M (a) = tp
+
N (b), which means that Tu(M |a) = Tu(N |b), and by the preceding lemma
there exists a common continuation of M and N by f and g into a model P of T , with
f(a) = g(b) := c. The (complete) positive type p(b, y) is realised by fα in (P, f), so as N
is existential there exists a realisation β ∈ Ny of p(b, y) in N ; as p(b, y) is complete, we
have tp+M(aα) = p(xy) = tp
+
N (bβ), so (aα, bβ) ∈ S. By symmetry, if we choose β ∈ Ny
we may find α ∈ Ny such that (aα, bβ) ∈ S, which is thus a back-and-forth system, and
M ≡∞ N by Karp’s theorem. 
Remark 3.8. (i) If T is a complete h-universal theory and M is an existential model of
an h-inductive theory T ′ ⊂ T , then T ′u ⊂ Tu and M is an existential model of T .
(ii) By the theorem, if M and N have the same h-universal theory T of which they are
existential models, they are infinitely equivalent.
Corollary 3.9. Let T be an h-inductive theory. If M,N |=e T , a, b ∈ Mx, Nx and
tp+M (a) = tp
+
N (b), then for every formula ϕ(x) ∈ L∞ω, we have M |= ϕ(a) if and only if
N |= ϕ(b).
Proof. Let c be a new tuple of constants with the same sorting as a and b : the L(c)-
structures (M,a) and (N, b) are existential models of T in this extended language, and
the hypothesis says that Tu(M |a) = Tu(N |b) (as before, because a and b satisfy the
same positive sentences); by the preceding theorem we have (M,a) ≡∞ (N, b). Now if
ϕ(x) ∈ L∞ω, the formula ϕ(c/x) is in L(c)∞ω, soM |= ϕ(a) if and only ifM |= ϕ(b). 
Let now p(x) ∈ Sx(T ) be a finitary positive type over T : if a and b are two realisations
of p in existential models M and N of T , we have tp+M (a) = tp
+
N(b) and by the corollary,
for every formula ϕ(x) ∈ L∞ω we haveM |= ϕ(a) if and only if N |= ϕ(b), so the formulas
of L∞ω satisfied by a realisation of p in an existentiel model of T do not vary with the
realisation. We may thus define [ϕ(x)] = {p ∈ Sx(T ) : ∀M |=
e T,∀a ∈ Mx, a |=M
p ⇒ M |= ϕ(a)} for any such formula. Now if pi(x) is a geometric type such that
[ϕ(x)] = [pi(x)] by Proposition 2.6, for every existential model M of T and a ∈ Mx, we
have M |= ϕ(a)⇔ tp+M(a) ∈ [ϕ(x)]⇔M |= pi(a), which means we have the
Corollary 3.10. For every formula ϕ(x) ∈ L∞ω, there exists a geometric type piϕ(x)
such that for every existential model M of T and every a ∈ Mx, one has M |= ϕ(a) if
and only if M |= piϕ(a).
Corollary 3.11. If M,N |=e T and f :M → N , then f is ∞-elementary.
Proof. Let ϕ(x) ∈ L∞ω and m ∈ Mx. By the preceding corollary we find a geometric
type piϕ(x) equivalent to ϕ(x) in existential models of T . If M |= ϕ(m), we thus have
M |= pi(m), whence N |= pi(fm) (because the validity of geometric types is preserved
under homomorphisms) and N |= ϕ(fm) : f is ∞-elementary. 
We step back to the classical setting. If U is any finitary first order theory, let UG be its
positive Morleyisation in the language LG (see [3]). We notice that positive Morleyisation
does not change the size of the language, i.e. |LG| = |L| = κ.
Corollary 3.12. For every formula ϕ(x) ∈ L∞ω, there exists a formula ϕ
′(x) of L22κω
such that ϕ′ is equivalent to ϕ in every ω-saturated L-structure.
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Proof. We note λ = 22
κ
. Let U = ∅. Every formula ϕ(x) of LG∞ω is logically equivalent
in existential models of UG to a normal geometric type pi(x). There are at most λ
non equivalent such types, each of one having stricltly less than λ elements, so ϕ(x) is
logically equivalent, in existential models of UG, to a formula of LGλω, the conjunction
of the type pi(x). In particular, this is true for every formula ϕ(x) of L∞ω, and every
geometric formula ψ =
∨
Φψ in piϕ is logically equivalent modulo U
G to a formula
ψ′ =
∨
{θ′ : θ ∈ Φψ}, where θ
′ ∈ L for each θ ∈ Φψ. Now if M is any ω-saturated L-
structure,MG is an existential model of UG, hence ϕ is equivalent inM to
∧
ψ∈pi
∨
θ∈Φψ
θ′,
a formula of Lλω. 
This corollay means that we may define the "infinitary type" of a finite tuple as a set
of formulas, if we allow ourselves to work in ω-saturated structures or more generally
in existential models in posiive model theory, because we may assign a bound to the
complexity of the formulas we need.
These considerations about other kinds of logical operations in the context of positive
model theory were originally motivated by an attempt to introduce some elements of
the classical setting, in order to take care of other formulas than positive ones. The
"constructible" formulas introduced in section 1 are interpreted as spectral open subsets
of positive type spaces. As the Stone space of ultrafilters of this Boolean algebra of subsets
of Sx(T ) is compact for the usual topology, a most natural question is the "semantic"
meaning of this compactness. Now the natural order on this Boolean algebra is given
by [ϕ(x)] ≤ [ψ(x)] ⇔ for every positive model M of T , M |= ∀x ϕ(x) ⇒ ψ(x). This
last sentence being h-inductive, this is equivalent to saying that ”∀x ϕ(x) ⇒ ψ(x)” ∈
Tk, the Kaiser hull of T . In other words, the Boolean algebra of constructible subsets
of Sx(T ) reflects the logic of models of Tk and not of positive models of T , and the
ultrafilters are the "constructible types" of tuples in models of Tk. As such they generalise
the positive types, but as the satisfaction of constructible sentences is not stable under
homomorphisms in general, there is little hope for this to be useful in positive model
theory, at least in general.
Another Boolean algebra of possible interest would be the algebra of regular spectrally (or
alternatively definably) open subsets, with its compact space of ultrafilters, the semantic
meaning of which is much less clear, in particular because we do not know at present
if positive types induce ultrafilters of regular opens (in both cases). We leave it as a
distinct problem to be adressed in further research.
4. Geometric Morleyisation
The existence of positively existentially closed and existentially universal structures
in a full subcategory C of L is secured whenever C is closed under directed colimits.
This would allow one to expand the basic considerations of positive model theory to
the more general "geometric theories", which we will call here "g-inductive", in order to
keep with the habit of not distinguishing between formulas and axioms in set-theoretic
model theory. We will say that a formula ϕ(x) in L∞ω is g-inductive, if it has the form
∀y ψ(x, y)⇒ χ(x, y), where ψ and χ are geometric; we may always suppose that ψ and χ
are normal, hence any class of g-inductive sentences is equivalent to a set of g-inductive
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sentences from L2κω. Without loss of generality, we then define a g-inductive theory as
a set of g-inductive sentences and one easily checks the following
Lemma 4.1. The full subcategory M(T ) of models of a g-inductive theory T is closed
under directed colimits.
One could try and reproduce the concepts arising in positive model theory, as positive
models, positive types... for such g-inductive theories. However, the lack of compact-
ness for infinitary logic would throw out every result which essentially needs it in this
context, so this would seem to be a different kind of study. Nevertheless, it is possible
to axiomatise the positive models of an h-inductive theory by a g-inductive one, hence
positive model theory is in some sense a particular case of geometric logic, in which some
of the first order compactness is "retained".
In this short and last section we will rather study the interplay between infinitary logic
and g-inductive theories, as sketched in the precedent section with Corollary 3.12 which
simplifies the formulas of L∞ω in ω-saturated L-structures; this might have been proved
directly, but we have used positive Morleyisation, showing that this is essentially a posi-
tive model theoretic property. It is known that infinitary theories may be translated in
a very general way into "basic ones" (see [6], Proposition 3.2.8); however, we have not
read about the reduction of L∞ω to geometric logic by this kind of Morleyisation, so we
adress this question here, restricting ourselves to a theory T in L∞ω, for a finitary first
order language L. As T is a set there exists a cardinal λ such that T ⊂ Lλω and we may
adapt positive Morleyisation to this fragment in the following simple way.
Definition 4.2. For every formula ϕ(x) of Lλω, we introduce a new relational symbol
of the same arity noted Rϕ(x), and we get an extended first order language L
G with the
same sorts. We then define the theory TG in LG, which contains the following sentences
of LG :
(i) If ϕ(x) is atomic in L, two g-inductive sentences expressing ∀x ϕ(x)⇔ Rϕ(x)
(ii) If Φ(x) is a λ-small set of formulas of Lλω, two g-inductive sentences expressing
∀x R∨Φ(x)⇔
∨
{Rϕ : ϕ ∈ Φ}(x)
(iii) If ϕ(x) is in Lλω, the sentences ∀x (Rϕ∧R¬ϕ)(x)⇒ ⊥ and ∀x ⊤ ⇒ (Rϕ∨R¬ϕ)(x)),
expressing ∀x ¬Rϕ(x)⇔ R¬ϕ(x)
(iv) If Φ(x) is a λ-small set of formulas of Lλω, the sentences ∀x (R
∧
Φ ∧
∨
{R¬ψ : ψ ∈
Φ})(x) ⇒ ⊥ and ∀x ⊤ ⇒ (R∧Φ ∨
∨
{R¬ψ : ψ ∈ Φ})(x), expressing ∀x R∧Φ(x) ⇔
¬
∨
{R¬ψ : ψ ∈ Φ}(x)
(v) If ϕ(x, y) is in Lλω, two sentences expressing ∀x R∃yϕ(x)⇔ ∃yRϕ(x, y)
(vi) If ϕ is a sentence in T , the propositional constant Rϕ.
The theory TG is g-inductive, and we call it the geometric Morleyisation of T .
Proposition 4.3. (i) Every model M of T has a canonical expansion MG which is a
model of TG, and the L-reduct of every model of TG is a model of T
(ii) The categories Mλω(T ) (of λ-elementary extensions of models of T ) andM(T
G) (of
homomorphisms of models of TG) are isomorphic.
Proof. (i) Let M be a model of T . For every formula ϕ(x) ∈ Lλω, we interpret Rϕ(x)
in M as ϕ(x)M : call this expansion MG. By definition of TG one checks that MG is a
model of the axioms introduced in clauses (i)-(v) of the definition of TG. As for clause
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(vi), if ϕ ∈ T is a sentence, the propositional constant Rϕ is in L
G, and is interpreted in
MG as ϕM , which is M∅ = {∅}, i.e. MG |= Rϕ, so M
G |= TG.
Conversely, if M |= TG, we must prove that M |L |= T , and for this we show that
M |= Rϕ(a) if and only if M |L |= ϕ(a), for every sentence with parameters ϕ(a) with
ϕ(x) ∈ Lλω and a ∈Mx, by induction on the complexity of ϕ :
- If ϕ is atomic, by definition of TG we have M |= ∀x Rϕ(x) ⇔ ϕ(x) (clause (i) of the
definition of TG); we then have M |L |= ϕ(a)⇔M |= ϕ(a)⇔M |= Rϕ(a)
- If ϕ =
∨
Φ, where Φ is a set of cardinality |Φ| < λ of formulas of Lλω, we have M |L |=
ϕ(a) ⇔ ∃ψ ∈ Φ,M |L |= ψ(a) ⇔ (by induction hypothesis) ∃ψ ∈ Φ,M |= Rψ(a) ⇔ (by
clause (ii) of the definition of TG) M |= Rϕ(a)
- If ϕ = ¬ψ, by induction hypothesis and clause (iii) of the definition of TG, we have
M |L |= ϕ(a)⇔M |L 6|= ψ(a)⇔M 6|= Rψ(a)⇔M |= Rϕ(a)
- If ϕ =
∧
Φ, we have M |L |= ϕ(a)⇔ ∀ψ ∈ Φ,M |L |= ψ(a)⇔ (by induction hypothesis)
∀ψ ∈ Φ,M |= Rψ(a) ⇔ (by the ¬ clause) 6 ∃ψ ∈ Φ,M |= R¬ψ(a) ⇔ (by the
∧
clause
(iv)) M |= Rϕ(a).
- If ϕ = ∃yψ, we have M |L |= ϕ(a) ⇔ ∃b ∈ My,M |L |= ψ(a, b) ⇔ (by induction
hypothesis) ∃b ∈My,M |= Rψ(a, b)⇔M |= ∃yRψ(a)⇔ (by the ∃ clause) M |= Rϕ(a)
- If ϕ = ∀yψ, we have M |L |= ϕ(a) ⇔ ∀b ∈ My,M |L |= ψ(a, b) ⇔ (by induction
hypothesis) ∀b ∈ My,M |= Rψ(a, b) ⇔6 ∃b ∈ My,M |= ¬Rψ(a, b) ⇔ (by the ¬ clause)
6 ∃b ∈ My,M |= R¬ψ(a, b) ⇔ M 6|= ∃yR¬ψ(a, y) ⇔ (by definition of R¬ψ(x, y)
M ) M 6|=
∃y¬ψ(a, y)⇔M |= ϕ(a).
By induction on the complexity of ϕ, we have M |L |= ϕ(a) if and only if M |= Rϕ(a).
Now if ϕ ∈ T is a sentence, we have Rϕ ∈ T
G, so M |= Rϕ and by what precedes we
have M |L |= ϕ, so M |L |= T .
(ii) If f : M → N is a λ-elementary embedding of models of T , it is a sorted map of
LG-structures between MG and NG, because LG has the same sorts as L. Suppose that
MG |= ϕ(a), where ϕ(x) is an atomic formula. If ϕ is an L-formula, we have N |= ϕ(fa)
by hypothesis on f , and if not, then ϕ(x) has the form R(ti(x) : i < m), with the ti’s
L-terms and R ∈ LG − L : there exists an Lλω-formula ϕ
′(x) such that R is equivalent
to Rϕ′ modulo T
G, hence we have MG |= ϕ′(ti(a) : i < m), so N
G |= ϕ′(ti(fa) : i < m),
i.e. NG |= ϕ(fa), because MG, NG |= TG by part (i) of the proposition. This shows
that G : (f : M → N) 7→ (f : MG → NG) defines a functor from the category M(T )
of models of T with λ-elementary embeddings to the category M(TG) of models of TG
with LG-homomorphisms.
In the other way round if f : M → N is an LG-homomorphism between models of TG,
define F (f : M → N) = (f : M |L → N |L) : by the first part of the proposition, M |L
and N |L are models of T , and if M |L |= ϕ(a) with ϕ(x) ∈ Lλω, by the first part of the
proof we have M |= Rϕ(a), so N |= Rϕ(fa) because f is an L
G-homomorphism, and
N |L |= ϕ(fa) : f is a λ-elementary L-embedding. This is now clear that G and F are
inverse iosmorphisms of categories. 
It is well known that geometric (i.e. g-inductive) theories have classifying topoi, there-
fore the categories of set-theoretic models of g-inductive theories are essentially the cate-
gories of points of such topoi. By geometric Morleyisation, the preceding theorem shows
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that the category of models of any theory in L∞ω (with suitable morphisms, or working
within a fixed fragment), is essentially the category of points of a such a topos.
Appendix A. Existential Forcing
In [4], Chapter 3, it is explained how the class of generic structures for Robinson’s
infinite forcing in an inductive class is a subclass of the class of existentially universal
structures. Here we have not generalised the theory of infinite forcing in the more general
positive context, but we have generalised in section 3 the notion of existentially universal
model of [4], Chapter 1; this was natural in terms of an intepretation of infinitary logic
in positive type spaces. In this appendix we interpret this as a forcing in models of Tu,
for which the existential models are the generic ones.
Definition A.1. (i) Let A |= Tu, ϕ(x) ∈ L∞ω any formula and a ∈ Ax. We will say that
A (existentially) forces ϕ(a), written A e ϕ(a), if for every positive type p(x) ∈ Sx(T )
such that tp+(a) ⊂ p, one has p ∈ [ϕ(x)].
(ii) We will say that a model M of Tu is existentially generic, if for every formula ϕ(x) ∈
L∞ω and a ∈Mx, one has
M |= ϕ(a)⇔M e ϕ(a).
Remark A.2. (i) Existential forcing is stable under continuations : if A |= Tu and
A e ϕ(a), and if f : A→ B |= Tu, then one has B 
e ϕ(fa).
(ii) If M |=+ T , one has M e ϕ(a) if and only if tp+(a) ∈ [ϕ(x)].
(iii) Contrary to classical finite and infinite forcing, existential forcing allows the consid-
eration of infinitary formulas, thanks to the definition using the type spaces.
Lemma A.3. If M |=+ T , then for every formula ϕ(x) ∈ L∞ω and a ∈ Mx, one has
M e ϕ(a) or M e ¬ϕ(a).
Proof. By (ii) of the preceding remark, if M 6e ϕ(a) we have tp+(a) /∈ [ϕ(x)], hence
tp+(a) ∈ Sx(T )− [ϕ(x)] = [¬ϕ(x)], i.e. M 
e ¬ϕ(a). 
This property is the usual notion of "genericity" for model theoretic forcing; however,
genericity is construed for satisfaction to be equivalent to forcing, and because of the
possible use of infinite conjunctions in building the formulas of L∞ω this will only be the
case in existential models, as shows the following
Theorem A.4. The existential models of Tu are the existentially generic models.
Proof. In the direct sense, let M |=e T . We proceed by induction on the complexity
of ϕ(x) ∈ L∞ω to showing that for a ∈ Mx we have M |= ϕ(a) ⇔ M  ϕ(a); we let
p = tp+(a). It suffices to treat the inductive steps of (infinite) conjunctions, negations
and existential quantifications.
- If ϕ is atomic, then satisfaction and forcing trivially coincide
- If ϕ =
∧
Φ, we have M |= ϕ(a) ⇔ for every ψ ∈ Φ, M |= ψ(a) ⇔ (by induction
hypothesis) ∀ψ ∈ Φ, M  ψ(a) ⇔ p ∈
⋂
{[ψ(x)] : ψ ∈ Φ} = [
∧
Φ(x)] = [ϕ(x)], i.e.
M  ϕ(a)
- If ϕ = ¬ψ, then M |= ϕ(a) ⇔ M 6|= ψ(a) ⇔ (by induction hypothesis) M 6 ψ(a) ⇔
(by Lemma A.3, as M |=+ T ) M  ϕ(a)
- If ϕ = (∃y)ψ, suppose M |= ϕ(a) : there exists b ∈ My such that M |= ϕ(a, b), hence
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by induction hypothesis we have M  ψ(a, b), i.e. q(x, y) = tp+(a, b) ∈ [ψ(x, y)]; if
pi : Sxy(T ) → Sx(T ) is the canonical projection, we have p = pi(q) and pi([ψ(x, y)]) =
[ϕ(x)] (CHECK !!!), whence p ∈ [ϕ(x)] and M  ϕ(a). Conversely, if M  ϕ(a) we have
p ∈ [ϕ(x)], hence there exists q ∈ [ψ(x, y)] such that p = pi(q); the positive type q(a, y)
is consistent with T and D+M (CHECK) hence as M is existential there is a realisation
b of q(a, b) in My, which means tp
+(a, b) ∈ [ψ(x, y)], i.e. M  ψ(a, b). By induction
hypothesis we have M |= ψ(a, b) and by definition we get M |= ϕ(a). The proof that M
is existentially generic is complete.
As for the reciprocal, let M |= Tu be existentially generic, and suppose M is not an
existential model of Tu : there exists a partial positive type pi(x, b) with finite parameters
in My, such that pi(x, b) is consistent with D
+M ∪ Tu but is not realised in M . This
means we may find a homorphism f :M → N |= Tu such that N |= (∃x)
∧
pi(x, fb), and
we may suppose N |=e T , whereas M 6|= (∃x)
∧
pi(x, b). As M is generic, we have M 
¬(∃x)
∧
pi(x, b), and as forcing is stable under continuations we getN  ¬(∃x)
∧
pi(x, fb);
now by the first part of the proof N is generic, hence N |= ¬(∃x)
∧
pi(x, fb), which is a
contradiction. By reductio ad absurdum, M is an existential model of Tu. 
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